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Abstract: The existence of discrete time windows has triggered the search for permanence and continuity for artists (including poets) in
multiple cultures throughout history. In this article, we argue that there exists a 3-s window in the temporal structure of poems as well as
in the aesthetic appreciation of poetry by reviewing previous literature on the temporal aspects of poems. This 3-s window can also be
considered to be a general temporal machinery underlying human behavior, including language production and perception in general. The
reafference principle has provided us a unique frame for understanding cognitive processes. However, “time” was absent in the original
two-stage reafference principle. Therefore, we propose a three-stage cycling model of language perception, taking into account time and
time windows. We also inspect the possible neural implementations of the three stages: the generation, maintenance, and comparison of
predictions (as well as the integration of predictions into the representational context). These three stages are embedded in a temporal
window of ~3 s and are repeated in a cycling mode, resulting in the representational context being continuously updated. Thus, it is possi-
ble that “semantics” could be carried forward across different time windows, being a “glue” linking the discrete time windows and thus
achieving the subjective feeling of temporal continuity. Candidates of such “semantic glue” could include semantic and syntactic struc-
tures as well as identity and emotion.
Keywords: language perception; poem appreciation; reafference principle; temporal perception; time window
Correspondence Professor Yan Bao, School of Psychological and Cognitive Sciences, Peking University, 5 Yiheyuan Road, Beijing
100871, China. Email: baoyan@pku.edu.cn
Received 28 April 2020. Accepted 21 June 2020.
Observations of discrete time windows has triggered the
search for permanence and continuity for artists and cogni-
tive scientists alike. Reconciling discrete temporal windows
and perceptual continuity has always been a challenge in
the field of cognitive science. In this article, we first review
current evidence for a specific time window, the 3-s win-
dow, in the recitation and appreciation of poems as well as
in the production and perception of language; then, we pro-
pose a three-stage model as a possible basis for perceptual
continuity despite the discreteness of time windows, which
not only accounts for perceptual continuity in language
processing but also potentially in cognitive processing in
general.
The pursuit of permanence
East and West, poets in all cultures and at all ages refer to
time in their poems. Many poets have emphasized the dis-
creteness of human life; every human owns only one time
window of hopefully some tens of years. These time
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windows come to an end, and all humans are subject to a
finite life span, as expressed for instance by the German
poet Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) in “Nänie:” “Auch das
Schöne muß sterben! Das Menschen und Götter
bezwinget” (“Even the beautiful must perish! It conquers
human and gods alike”), or by the Spanish poet Federico
García Lorca (1898–1936) in “Alma Ausente:” “No te con-
oce el niño ni la tarde, porque te has muerto para siempre”
(“The child and the afternoon do not know you, because
you have died for ever”). The Chinese poet Zhang Ruoxu
(660–720) was a pessimist: “人生代代无穷已/江月年年只
相似” (“Generations and generations, there is no end/Years
and years, the moon on the river is just the same”); the only
glue of time seems to be the merciless moon.
However, many artists have also tried to overcome such
discreteness to create continuity or permanence and even
infinity. This pursuit for permanence is a common senti-
ment across cultures, and it is reflected in different forms
of arts. Paintings, photographs, poems, and essays capture
a scene and make it permanent as long as the artwork
exists. Epic paintings make a moment of an event perma-
nent; scenery paintings make beautiful scenes permanent,
and travel notes and diaries keep the episodes alive when-
ever and wherever someone reads them. The existence of
artwork itself marks the permanence of the work and the
artist who created it. The artists, although living within the
time window of their existence only, create permanence
through their works, passing down through generations.
This has been long expressed by poets: They know that
they will not perish, and will glue the time windows of the
human life spans together to achieve continuity and perma-
nence through their works and thoughts. The Roman poet
Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus, 65 B.C.–8 B.C.)
claimed that “Annorum series et fuga temporum./Non
omnis moriar multaque pars mei/Vitabit Libitinam: isque
ego postera. . .” (I would not entirely die and a large part of
me will avoid Libitina [the goddess of funerals and burial];
fresh, I continually would grow with future praise. . .). Sim-
ilarly, the English poet William Shakespeare (1564–1616)
expressed in Sonnet 18 that “So long as men can breathe,
or eyes can see,/So long lives this, and this gives life to
thee;” “this” being the poem. Poems, stories, and theories
(in the world of science) will continue to exist after the
time window of one’s own existence ends; later, other peo-
ple can still pick them up to read, to praise, and to elabo-
rate. The discrete time windows of life cannot only be
glued by a merciless moon (as for Zhang Ruoxu in 春江花
月夜 “A Moonlit Night On The Spring River”) but also by
the cycle of generating and receiving information and
knowledge (Pöppel & Bao, 2011). These works of art col-
lectively indicate that the seemingly impermanence and dis-
creteness of human life can become permanent and
continuous through information processed and knowledge
created that connect generations across ages in history.
A temporal constant of ~3 s in poetry
In addition to the pursuit of permanence, one can identify
another temporal characteristic in poetry when poems are
recited or read aloud. Poems are composed of verses or
lines (for a definition of lines, see Turner & Pöppel, 1988).
Each line in a poem takes up a certain duration of time. Is
there a universal time constant for poetic lines when people
read them aloud or recite them by heart? Turner and
Pöppel (1988) collected over 20 types of poetry, varying
from East to West and from modern societies to indigenous
cultures, and found a constant of ~3 s for the duration of
poetic lines.
One may argue that this observation is a consequence of
the number of syllables, as there is the possibility that
every culture may have a similar syllable number per poetic
line. Given the temporal constancy of syllable articulation,
the observation of ~3 s might be the result of mere item-
based (i.e., syllable-number-based) characteristics. We
reexamined the data presented by Turner and Pöppel (1988)
where the poems have a constant syllabic length; the result
is plotted in Figure 1. The mean of the temporal length of
lines is 3.09, with an SD of 0.64 s, as plotted in this figure
(Lines indicate M  SD.) We did not get a significant
Pearson correlation, p = .348, r = 0.261, nor a Spearman
correlation, p = .314, ρ = 0.279, of these two variables
based on the poetry types with constant syllables (which
are Japanese epic meter and tanka; Chinese four, five, and
seven-syllable line; English seven-syllable trochaic line and
octosyllabic ballad meter, ancient Greek dactylic hexameter
half-line, trochaic tetrameter half-line, iambic trimester,
anapestic tetrameter half-line, Latin elegiac couplet, dac-
tylic hexameter half-line, hendecasyllabic, and French
12-syllabic alexandrine; see Table 1). Note that a signifi-
cant correlation is still not present after removing the data
point of “Latin elegiac couplet.” Bearing the risk of inter-
preting null results in statistics, this result suggests that the
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temporal constant of poetic lines is not a result of a con-
stancy in syllabic length but presumably a temporal
constant.
Our conclusion fits with our experience that we automat-
ically speak slower with less syllables in one poetic line,
and relatively faster if there are more syllables; if there are
too many syllables in one “sentence,” we will enter a pause
in the middle and separate them into multiple lines in reci-
tation (Pöppel, 1988). One typical example of slowing
down comes from the poem of “Il pleure dans mon cœur”
by the French poet Paul Verlaine (1844–1896): “C’est bien
la pire peine/De ne savoir pourquoi/Sans amour et sans
haine,/Mon cœur a tant de peine.” (And the worst pain of
all/Must be not to know why/Without love and without
hate/My heart feels such pain (Richard Stokes, Trans.). In
this example, one automatically speaks slower when there
are fewer syllables in one line. Less words are employed in
one line to express a depression in this case; the pace of
citing is slowed down to fit into the 3-s time window.
There was, however, severe criticism of Turner and
Pöppel (1988) by Fabb (2013), who claimed that the 3 s
constant in poetic lines does not exist. Fabb made this con-
clusion mainly based on a recording corpus of English
poems that he collected and argued that there are plenty of
poetic lines exceeding 3 s. There may have been, however,
a misunderstanding by Fabb concerning the 3-s time win-
dow; it is not a window with a ceiling of exactly 3 s as one
would expect from a physical constant but is an operational
platform based on statistical analyses reflecting an endoge-
nous neural mechanism with some variance being typical
for biological processes. This means that many poetic lines
have a duration of ~3 s, with some variance to give rise to
a median/mean value of ~3 s. This mean value can be
shown also in Fabb’s own corpus. Fabb (2013) recorded
55 English poems, and the data of the median/mean line
duration for each poem were listed in the article. In
Figure 2, we plot the distribution of the mean and the
median of line duration in Fabb’s article. The mean of
median duration (for each poem) is 3.28 s, SD = 0.853 s,
and the mean of mean duration is 3.38 s, SD = 0.893 s. As
two slightly skewed distributions (skewness of median
duration = 0.240, skewness of mean duration is 0.146, note
that the two distributions all pass a Shapiro–Wilk normality
test, p > .05 whereas the distribution of median duration
exhibits a p = .049 in the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test with
Lilliefors correction), the median of median duration is
3.10 s, and the median of mean duration is 3.22 s. This
result, in contrast to what Fabb argued, actually shows the
robustness of the 3-s time window, as it applies to a new
set of poems collected by another independent researcher.
Exceeding the exact value of ~3 s does not invalidate the
existence of this time window in poems; it is not unusual
Table 1
Syllabic Length and Temporal Length of Poem Types with Constant Syl-







Japanese epic meter 6 3.25
Japanese Tanka 10.33 2.70
Chinese four-syllable line 4 2.20
Chinese five-syllable line 5 3.00



























Figure 1. Visualizing syllabic length and temporal length of one line in
different type of poems from Turner and Pöppel (1988).
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that human cognitive processes are subject to variation
(e.g., Bao, Yang, Lin, & Pöppel, 2016).
One might still argue that this notion of a 3-s time win-
dow is trivial, as it matches approximately the normal
human respiratory cycle of 12 to 15 breaths per minute
(Barrett, Barman, Boitano, & Brooks, 2012). One reason
for this explanation to be unlikely is that poems as works
of art do not have any intrinsic characteristics to match the
human respiratory cycles. Furthermore, humans are not
forced to obey the respiratory cycle in speech
(Parkes, 2006). In this context, it is useful to take a more
general biological perspective comparing the 3-s window in
humans with a potential equivalent in other species. It has
been observed that the 3-s window is also a frame for
(repetitive) behavioral segments in humans and other
higher mammals (Gerstner & Cianfarani, 1998; Gerstner &
Fazio, 1995; Gerstner & Goldberg, 1994; Kien, Schleidt, &
Schöttner, 1991; Schleidt, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, & Pöppel,
1987). This time window being the same in speech and
other motor activities in different species indicates that they
share a common logistic temporal mechanism (Pöppel,
1997a). However, the breathing rate of higher mammals
does not necessarily match with 3 s. For example, the
median duration of motion segments for a giraffe is 2.61 s
and the mean is 3.61 s (Gerstner & Fazio, 1995) whereas
the mean respiratory rate is 6.57 s (Langman, Bamford, &
Maloiy, 1982). Therefore, the pattern of 3 s in speech and
other motor behaviors is not a passive reflection of breath-
ing cycles, although we do not dismiss the possibility that
respiratory cycles can modulate the duration of such time
windows.
Another reason that the 3-s window does not reflect a
trivial phenomenon is that poem appreciation is not only
productional but also perceptual, thus providing an impor-
tant synchrony of production and perception on the aes-
thetic level. By simply altering the temporal length of
poetic line (without changing the syllable number), Zhao,
Zhang, and Bao (2018) discovered a cross-culturally robust
preference of poetic lines in the 3-s range. Even if the sub-
jects cannot understand the meaning of the poetic lines
(in this case, German subjects listening to Chinese poems),
they still prefer lines of ~3 s. This observation indicates a
production–perception synchrony of ~3 s, which means that
we not only tend to recite poems (and speech in a more gen-
eral sense; discussed later) with a 3-s pattern but also appreci-
ate poems aesthetically within the same temporal frame. This
temporal preference for a 3-s pattern and not a 1-s or a 10-s
pattern, which linguistically would be possible, indicates pre-
sumably a profound evolutionary basis. The temporal modu-
lation effect of the 3-s window on aesthetic appreciation may
also motivate to look for other concepts and phenomena of
the cognitive and neural basis of aesthetic perception in gen-
eral and in detail, as has been partly already done for deci-
sion processes, the visual arts, and music (Avram
et al., 2013; Bao et al., 2016; Bao et al., 2017; Park
et al., 2014; Park et al., 2015; Pöppel, 1989a).
A necessary distinction between content and
logistic functions
Speech is of a transient nature, which obviously means that
what has been said no longer physically exists after it has
been said; this implies that one has to utilize a segmentation
process to store and process information (Christiansen &
Chater, 2016) and that this segmentation process most likely
Figure 2. The distribution of the tem-
poral length of poetic lines, based on
data from Fabb (2013).
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has its limits. Some have addressed the nature of such limits
as item-based, like the magical number of 7  2 by
Miller (1956) or 4  1 by Cowan (2001). Others have
addressed the nature of such segmentation as time-based, as
suggested by the 3-s time window by Pöppel (1997a),
which is the main focus of this article. However, no matter
if such segmentation is item-based or time-based, one has
to stress that this segmentation process is logistic. This
means that segmentation itself is relatively independent of
the content that is segmented. No matter what one is
segmenting, the segmentation limit is always 7  2 or
4  1 if item-based or ~3 s if time-based, indicating that
this limit has a logistic characteristic or is “pre-semantic”
(Pöppel, 1997a, 2009). We avoid using the ambiguous term
chunk, as chunking can happen on multiple levels
(Christiansen & Chater, 2016); one has to chunk at least
one whole sentence as one to understand it.
The logistic-content distinction appears to be necessary
for a deeper understanding of cognitive processes. It is not
controversial that percepts, memories, emotions, or voli-
tions represent the content of our cognitive systems. How-
ever, temporal organization, attentional control, and general
activation or arousal are not on the same categorical level
as the content functions. The temporal organization of dif-
ferent content functions cannot be classified at the same
logical level as can content functions themselves. Further-
more, attentional systems operate on content functions
rather than with them in parallel (Bao et al., 2011; Bao &
Pöppel, 2007; B. Zhou, Bao, Sander, Trahms, &
Pöppel, 2010). Thus, attentional processes can also not be
classified at the same logical level as content functions. In
addition, arousal modulated by the activation system repre-
sents another neural process that is logically different from
content functions; it is functioning like a “power supply” of
the central nervous system. Therefore, it is necessary to
separate the logistic functions (temporal control, attentional
mechanisms, and activation of functions) from the content
functions. The logistic functions are the “how” functions
providing the necessary neuronal infrastructure for “the
state of being conscious” (Pöppel, 1997b) whereas the con-
tent functions are the “what” functions that are related to
conscious representation (Pöppel, 1989b; B. Zhou
et al., 2016).
Such logistic-content distinction can be seen in physio-
logical and imaging studies of auditory speech processing.
For example, the acoustic analysis of the auditory temporal
structure is observed in the superior temporal sulcus
whereas speech-related activations appear in more brain
areas (Ding, Melloni, Zhang, Tian, & Poeppel, 2016; Over-
ath, McDermott, Zarate, & Poeppel, 2015). Following these
findings, we can conjecture that the logistic “containers”
root partly in the functionally or temporally earlier areas in
the processing routes. For example, bistable perception of
the Necker cube can be decoded even in early visual areas in
the posterior visual cortex (M. Wang, Arteaga, & He, 2013).
The concept of central timing mechanisms has been dis-
cussed for quite some time, based for instance on the similar
temporal order threshold of tens of milliseconds or the multi-
modal response distributions of reaction time and eye move-
ment latencies, and the low-frequency time window of
several seconds across modalities (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961;
Pöppel, 1970, 1994, 1997a; Pöppel & Logothetis, 1986;
Wittmann, 1999). Taken together, the distinction between
content and logistic functions appears to be necessary,
reflecting fundamental biological mechanisms, and temporal
processing serves as one of these logistic functions.
A logistic time window of ~3 s in language
The 3-s synchrony in the recitation and appreciation of
poetry is similarly observed in language in general: Lin-
guistic utterances have the tendency to be expressed with
temporal segments of ~3 s (Kien & Kemp, 1994; Kowal,
O’Connell, & Sabin, 1975; Schleidt & Kien, 1997;
Vollrath, Kazenwadel, & Krüger, 1992; note that the results
of Kowal et al., 1975) were re-analyzed for more clarity;
see Table 2). These findings indicate that there is a periodic
nature of ~3 s in human verbal behavior, meaning that a
conspicuous pause often appears approximately every
3 s. We argue that besides being a logistic segmentation
window for language production, the logistic 3-s time win-
dow is also underlying language perception. Note that in
this context, we do not distinguish systematically between
language perception and language processing (as in
Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; note that in the citations of this
article, “Poeppel” refers to Dr. David Poeppel, and
“Pöppel” refers to Dr. Ernst Pöppel).
Both behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for
other cognitive functions support the concept that the inter-
val of 3 s is something special in temporal processing (Bao
et al., 2013; Elbert, Ulrich, Rockstroh, & Lutzenberger,
1991; Fraisse, 1984; Kagerer, Wittmann, Szelag, &
Steinbüchel, 2002; Pöppel, 1972, 1997a). A 3-s time
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window has for instance been demonstrated in experiments
on auditory bistable perception, indicating perceptual seg-
mentation. When listening to ambiguous (i.e., bistable)
auditory stimuli such as “KU-BA-KU,” people switch their
perception spontaneously approximately every 3 s between
“KUBA” and “BAKU” (Radilová, Pöppel, & Ilmberger,
1990; von Steinbüchel, 1998). This phenomenon of percep-
tual alteration applies also for bistable visual figures
(Gómez, Argandoña, Solier, Angulo, & Vázquez, 1995;
Polgári, Causin, Weiner, Bertschy, & Giersch, 2020; von
Steinbüchel, 1998). A 3-s time window in auditory tempo-
ral segmentation is also indicated electrophysiologically by
the event-related potential (ERP) component of mismatch
negativity (MMN; L. Wang et al., 2016; L. Wang, Lin,
Zhou, Pöppel, & Bao, 2015) and magnetoencephalography
experiments (Sams, Hari, Rif, & Knuutila, 1993). A larger
MMN for deviant stimuli is elicited if the interval between
successive auditory stimuli is around 3 s; the MMN ampli-
tude decreases after 3 s, but restores again after around
6 s, indicating an oscillatory neural mechanism with a
period of ~3 s. The fact that the human cognitive system is
more open for new stimuli approximately every 3 s is
sometimes misunderstood as by White (2017); he claimed
that the MMN being observed also after an interval of 9 to
12 s would contradict the hypothesis of temporal integra-
tion on a time scale of ~3 s; this is certainly a misunder-
standing. Note, however, that the concept of a 3-s time
window or a high-frequency time window of ~30 ms to
40 ms does not exclude time windows between these
periods; for example, the window of 150 ms to 300 ms
(e.g., Ding et al., 2017; Hickok & Poeppel, 2007;
Poeppel & Assaneo, 2020), in which suprasegmental infor-
mation is carried. This inclusion of other temporal
windows has actually already been stated by Szelag and
Pöppel (2000).
Abundant behavioral and neurophysiological evidence
has proven the existence of a 3-s time window also in lan-
guage perception. Early behavioral evidence came from
Sachs (1974), where subjects were asked to report if a sen-
tence was identical to a previous one. The two sentences
were distanced by sentences with different numbers of syl-
lables. There is a significant drop and a plateau after the
3-s window both for auditory stimuli (between 3 s and
7.5 s) and visual stimuli (between 1 s and 4 s). Such results
suggest that subjects in these experiments were more sensi-
tive to changes in a sentence if they are in the same tempo-
ral segment of ~3 s. Wagers and Phillips (2009) discovered
that the plausibility effect of a sentence is weaker for longer
dependencies than are shorter ones in a self-paced reading
task. More significant differences in reading time after the
critical verb onset was observed for short dependency con-
ditions than for long dependency ones. In short dependency
conditions, the distance; that is, the interstimulus interval
(ISI), between the sentence-initial noun and the critical verb
is 1 (~450 ms, as estimated from the figure as the original
data were not provided) whereas the distance is 6 (~3 s) in
long dependency conditions. Thus, a difference within and
beyond the 3-s window is observed in this experiment. One
may argue that more interval conditions are needed to con-
firm that this effect is truly a staircase effect (indicating a
window) rather than a simple linear decreasing effect.
Nonetheless, Wagers and Phillips (2009) provided some
positive implications about the existence of this time win-
dow. Also note that such findings are unlikely to be a trivial
result of the human memory limits of item (i.e., 7  2 or
4  1), as one needs to chunk the whole sentence
Table 2
Average Duration per Speech Segment (re-analysis based on Kowal et al., 1975)
Age
Syllables per second (Kowal
et al., 1975)
Syllables per speech segment (Kowal
et al., 1975)
Average duration per speech
segment (s)
Kindergarten 2.15 (0.75) 5.5 (1.9) 2.56
Grade 2 2.86 (0.53) 7.4 (2.2) 2.59
Grade 4 3.24 (0.51) 7.6 (2.8) 2.35
Grade 6 3.26 (0.66) 7.3 (2.5) 2.24
Grade 8 3.83 (0.50) 9.4 (2.4) 2.45
Sophomores 4.00 (0.51) 9.9 (3.2) 2.48
Seniors 3.84 (0.52) 10.0 (3.2) 2.60
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent SDs. The average duration per speech segment is calculated from syllables per speech segment divided by syllables per
second.
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holistically in language perception, and there was no signif-
icant difference in answering the follow-up questions, indi-
cating that the subjects’ memory can equally hold up short
and long sentences in this experimental condition.
Schremm, Horne, and Rolls (2015) result has indicated that
the reaction time to grammatical and semantic incongruency
can be modulated by a 3-s window. Subjects reacted slower
if the critical words had a distance longer than ~3 s when
the number of words between them was the same.
Electrophysiological evidence also has supported the exis-
tence of a 3-s time window in language perception. Strong
evidence has come from Roll, Lindgren, Alter, and Horne
(2012), who examined the ERP component of the closure
positive shift (CPS), a centroparietal positivity related to per-
ceptual boundaries in language and music perception. A
more salient CPS effect was observed only when the clause
boundaries coincided with the temporal boundary of ~2.7 s.
This indicates that there is a logistic wrap-up effect enhanc-
ing the wrap-up effect of content. Roll, Gosselke, Lindgren,
and Horne (2013) studied the component of the left anterior
negativity (LAN) elicited by the anomaly of grammatical
agreement. They found that the LAN effect holds for a
(SOA) of 1.75 s and 2.25 s, but is not significant for an
SOA of 2.75 s. For an SOA beyond the 3-s window (3.25
s), an anterior negativity with different scalp topography was
observed, indicating different neural mechanisms inside and
outside the 3-s window. Phillips, Kazanina, and Abada (2005)
discovered that longer filler-gap dependency (ISI = 4000 ms)
will result in a delayed P600 effect, as compared to a shorter
dependency (ISI = 2000 ms). A similar experiment with ISIs
of 700 ms and 2600 ms did not report such a result on the
verb position (Fiebach, Schlesewsky, & Friederici, 2002).
This can be explained by the 3-s time window, as an ISI of
700 ms, 2000 ms, and 2600 ms falls into the 3-s window
whereas an ISI of 4000 ms does not, thus resulting in a qual-
itative difference for the P600 latency.
Synchronization in verbal communication
Based on these many different observations, one can con-
clude that the 3-s window acts as a segmentation frame for
both language production and perception. This production–
perception synchrony can be considered as the basis for
synchronization in verbal communications because it
allows the creation of shared temporal windows of commu-
nicators. They can synchronize their mutual “nowness” or
“subjective present” and share a temporal frame of refer-
ence in social interactions (Bao et al., 2015; Miyake, 2012;
Nagy, 2011; Pöppel, 1988, 1994, 1997b, 2009).
Synchronization on the basis of a 3-s time frame can
account for many aspects of human linguistic behaviors
(e.g., in conversations). Sometimes one does not finish
while speaking a sentence or omits parts of a sentence;
despite this, one can still successfully transmit a verbal
message. The fact that human speech segments follow a 3-s
time frame (Kowal et al., 1975; Vollrath et al., 1992) also
explains that one makes deletions to fit utterances into this
3-s time frame. The implicit consensus that speakers and
listeners all operate within a 3-s basis also saves energy, as
one does not have to shift between different temporal
frames from moment to moment. Thus, synchronization is
also the operative basis for anticipation; one implicitly
expects a speech segment to stop at around 3 s, and another
topic in conversation can be initiated after this time.
This 3-s temporal production–perception synchrony may
be based on similar neural mechanisms for speech produc-
tion and the perception systems as a result of an evolution-
ary co-adaptation of the time windows. The basic idea of a
social co-adaptation is that humans synchronize to each
other during numerous social interactions, adjusting indi-
vidual temporal windows to a common length (here, of ~3
s). Such synchronization in social interactions might
involve synchronization on both behavioral and physiologi-
cal levels (e.g., Dikker et al., 2017; Hale, Ward, Buccheri,
Oliver, & Hamilton, 2020). The neural and functional rela-
tionship between speech production and perception is not a
new topic; it has been discussed with respect to the
perception–production functions of Wernicke’s area
(Binder, 2015) and the motor theory of speech perception
(Liberman & Mattingly, 1985). Such low-frequency
auditory–motor interaction might also involve low-
frequency neural oscillatory coupling (e.g., with delta
waves); a similar scenario has been observed for the syl-
labic level (Assaneo & Poeppel, 2018).
The continuity of 3-s windows can be modeled with
oscillations. One has, however, to distinguish between two
different classes: pendulum oscillations and relaxation
oscillations. The continuity of 3-s windows can technically
be described as a pendulum oscillation, and physiologically
it can perhaps be related to the delta band wave in the elec-
troencephalogram. The frequency of the delta band
(0.5–4 Hz) perhaps matches the cycle of such a window,
and there is evidence that the delta band is related to the
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processing of intonational phrase boundaries
(e.g., Bourguignon et al., 2013; Molinaro, Lizarazu, Lallier,
Bourguignon, & Carreiras, 2016; for a review, see
Meyer, 2018), which often fall into the window of ~3
s. However, the 3-s time window can also be modeled by
relaxation oscillations (Pöppel, 1970, 1994) because the
ongoing pendulum oscillation can be interrupted at any
phase, and a new oscillatory process with the same or simi-
lar period is entrained with very short latency, a characteris-
tic of relaxation oscillations (for a recent discussion on
exogenous and endogenous cortical rhythms in language
processing, see Meyer, Sun, & Martin, 2019). Neural and
behavioral phenomenon below 1 Hz are often difficult to
identify (H. Zhou, Melloni, Poeppel, & Ding, 2016), but
they certainly account for a great part of human behavior
(e.g., Donhauser & Baillet, 2019; Teng et al., 2020). Indi-
vidual variance of the period of an oscillatory process can
possibly mask an oscillatory phenomenon below 1 Hz, as
seen in studies by L. Wang et al. (2016; L. Wang et al.,
2015). Therefore, single-case studies can be extremely use-
ful in elucidating such low-frequency oscillatory phenom-
ena (Bao et al., 2015; Bao et al., 2017, c; Pöppel &
Bao, 2017; Zaytseva & Bao, 2015).
A three-stage cycling model in language
processing
The concept of the reafference principle (von Holst &
Mittelstaedt, 1950, 1971) roots from the exploration of the
stability of vision by von Helmholtz (1896), and it was
later generalized using the term corollary discharge
(Teuber, 1960). The later notion of “predictive coding”
could also be seen as inspired by the reafference principle
(e.g., Clark, 2013; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Stefanics,
Kremláček, & Czigler, 2014). In the original version of the
reafference principle, an efference copy is generated in par-
allel to an action command for whatever one is doing. This
copy is then compared with the sensory information after
the execution of the action (i.e., the reafference). Thus,
there are two successive operations in the original
reafference principle: (a) the generation of an efference
copy and (b) the process of reafference allowing the com-
parison between the executed movement and the efference
copy. What is missing in the original concept and the
derived theories is the factor “time” (i.e., how long the
duration of an efference copy has to be maintained). Thus,
the reafference principle should actually comprise three
components: (a) generation of an efference copy (which
serves as the basis for prediction) in parallel to the motor
command, (b) maintenance of the efference copy or the
prediction in a temporal buffer, and (c) comparison of the
prediction with the sensory input after a specific temporal
interval. Another cycle with all its components then can be
initiated, be it either periodically under endogenous tempo-
ral control or in a voluntarily determined active mode.
A new cycle will not result in a simple repetition of what
is represented because there is always an updating in each
cycle, which will result each time in modified predictions
(Pöppel & Bao, 2011). As has been suggested, many cycles
could operate simultaneously in a hierarchical system, such
as the higher frequency cycles being embedded in the lower
frequency cycles (Tanida & Pöppel, 2006). This theoretical
concept provides an explanation for planning and con-
firming what has been planned as a basis for the continuity
of action and perception. This can also be considered as a
framework in realizing the original attempt of von Helm-
holtz (1896) in discussing the nature of visual continuity
despite saccadic eye movements (for a review, see
Wurtz, 2018) and visual stability across different areas of
the visual field which are characterized by different mecha-
nisms of spatial attention (Lei, Bao, Wang, &
Gutyrchik, 2012; Pöppel & Bao, 2012).
The reafference principle has indeed been suggested as a
theoretical frame for perceptual processes in general, and
has been suggested to explain “pre-emptive perception”
(Bodis-Wollner, 2008), “proactive perception” (Rimmele,
Morillon, Poeppel, & Arnal, 2018), the discontinuity of
thinking in schizophrenia (Feinberg, 1978), and speech
production (Tian & Poeppel, 2010, 2013; Tian, Zarate, &
Poeppel, 2016). Although the reafference principle has
been invited into the field of language perception
(Gambi & Pickering, 2017; Pickering & Clark, 2014; Pick-
ering & Gambi, 2018; Pickering & Garrod, 2013), the rea-
soning is basically on the computational and algorithmic
level (Marr, 1982). Neurobiological features of the princi-
ple refer mainly to perception–production connections
(Dick & Andric, 2013; Pickering & Garrod, 2013) rather
than to the basis of the two (or three, as we propose) opera-
tions in the reafference principle. Pickering and
Gambi (2018) introduced a cognitive model of reafference
in language perception, but did not consider its neural
implementation. We suggest possible neural mechanisms
(i.e., the hardware implementations) of reafference in
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language processing, in poetry in particular and cognitive
processes in general, while being compatible with current
linguistic concepts.
When processing a sentence, predictions can be gener-
ated before the “critical” word actually appears. For exam-
ple, when we hear/see the first part of a sentence (e.g., You
never forget how to ride. . . .), the following part can be
predicted (e.g., a bicycle, an elephant, etc.). Predictions can
have different weights. Here, “a bicycle” is more likely to
appear, but if “an elephant” appears, we know the sentence
is still congruent, but more integration efforts should be
implemented because “an elephant” is less likely to appear
here. Such a notion of prediction and integration, however,
is abstract, and it is difficult to be mapped directly onto
neural activities in the brain.
We propose that our three-stage model (as outlined ear-
lier) is compatible with language perception. These three
stages are not just a theoretical construct but are validated
by neural evidence and can be mapped onto certain neural
underpinnings. In our framework, the prediction-integration
process consists of three consecutive stages (see Figure 3):
(a) the generation of predictions, (b) the maintenance of
predictions, and (c) the comparison between prediction and
the current input (as well as the integration of the current
input into the representational context). Note that compari-
son is not the end of the story: After comparison, the input
word is integrated into the current semantic context (“narra-
tive”) and syntactic context (i.e., hierarchical structure),
which, along with the predictions, has also been persisting
through time. To be more precise, we would refer to the
“context” as a “gestalt.” Therefore, the whole process
should also include the generation and maintenance of con-
text, and the integration of the current information into
context; this process apparently falls into a larger temporal
window. Note that the “integration” we use here can be dif-
ferent from the way it is used in some psycholinguistic
research. One prominent feature of our model is that this
three-stage cycle operates in a 3-s time window. After one
Figure 3. An illustration of the three-stage cycling model in language processing. Note that the change from blue to yellow in the “maintenance of pre-
dictions” stage indicates a shift of processing machinery within and outside the 3-s window. Critical word W1 is compared and integrated with predictions
maintained by different mechanisms, based on its temporal onset (within/beyond the same 3-s window). If W1 is presented after the previous 3-s window
and related to the predictions of the former 3-s window, then it is compared and integrated in a different machinery, as the brain is currently in another 3-s
window, generating new predictions, and looking for new information. The cycling three-stage process as well as the continuously updated representational
context (“semantics”) allow for a temporal continuity across discrete time windows. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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cycle, the brain actively “looks for” something new, with
the launching of a new cycle, which has a range of ~3 s
(L. Wang et al., 2016; L. Wang et al., 2015). However, this
does not mean that the information maintained in the previ-
ous temporal window is lost. Rather, it is taken over by a
different cognitive machinery (discussed earlier, in the “A
logistic time window of ~3 seconds in language” section),
indicated by behavioral and electrophysiological studies
(Fiebach et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2005; Roll et al., 2013;
Sachs, 1974; Schremm et al., 2015; Wagers &
Phillips, 2009).
Predictions are generated before the “critical word” actu-
ally appears, as the brain activities predicting semantically
similar words are similar (L. Wang, Kuperberg, &
Jensen, 2018). L. Wang et al. (2018) also demonstrated that
such predictions are likely to be generated from left infe-
rior/medial temporal lobe. It often takes some time after
predictions for a certain word to be generated before it
actually appears; therefore, the prediction needs to be held
for a certain time. The cognitive demand of maintaining
predictions cannot be done without the continuity of spe-
cific neural activities. A possible candidate for such neural
persistence is the sustained anterior negativity
(e.g., Kluender & Kutas, 1993; Lau, 2018; Lau &
Liao, 2017; Phillips et al., 2005). During this sustaining
process, knowledge from long-term memory could be
retrieved to narrow down and re-weight the saliency of pre-
dictions, known as the notion of “prediction as memory
retrieval” (Chow, Momma, Smith, Lau, & Phillips, 2016).
The third stage is comparing the current input with the pre-
dictions; such comparison relies on the decodability of neu-
ral activities (e.g., de Lange, Heilbron, & Kok, 2018),
making it possible to compare “new” percepts with the
“old” predictions which are maintained. The new percepts
are then integrated into the current gestalt (context). The
well-known evoked potential components in some psycho-
linguistics studies (e.g., N400, P600, etc.) are likely to
reflect the third stage due to its temporal characteristics; it
appears after the critical word onset (e.g., Kutas &
Hillyard, 1980; Zhang, Yu, & Boland, 2010). Every time
each three-stage cycle ends, offline knowledge (i.e., long-
term memory or experience) is updated and can be utilized
in future predictions. In this way, “online” information
becomes “offline” and gets stored for future use.
In terms of oscillation, we conjecture that the critical
word for prediction (e.g., “ride” given in the example) re-
entrains a relaxation oscillation and initiates a new time
window; the oscillatory process continues, “waiting” for an
appropriate predictive operation (e.g., coupling) until the
target word (e.g., “a bicycle”) appears. Thus in this model,
the 3-s time window being implemented by successive
periods of an oscillation plays the decisive role for
understanding.
Continuity across discrete time windows to
form discourse gestalts
One might ask an obvious question: If information
processing is framed by successive discrete 3-s time win-
dows, why does one not sense the “bumps” or interruptions
when entering a new time window? This seemingly killer
question can be resolved after our reasonings on the 3-s
window and the reafference principle. Predictions do not
vanish to nowhere at the end of the 3-s windows. The dis-
crete time window does not stop the predictions from exis-
ting; information from the previous time window continues
to exist as predictions for the following time windows, and
through comparison and integration, the new inputs in the
recent time window are connected with information of the
previous time window(s). Thus, continuity can be achieved
across time windows. Through this process, utterance seg-
ments (with a duration of ~3 s) can be “glued” temporally
through prediction, comparison, and integration to form a
coherent discourse. The reafference principle can function
as a framework in understanding how discrete perceptual
units through time can be perceived as a holistic gestalt.
Contents in every single temporal window are integrated
into a gestalt. Such persisting gestalts form the prediction
of future input. The predictions can be compared and inte-
grated with future inputs or future gestalts, resulting in a
“full” gestalt or a new gestalt leading to future predictions.
The three-stage process is used to different extent across
individuals, which can be validated by the fact that different
people have different abilities in discourse comprehension,
and by experiments on holistic and analytical processing
strategies (Bao et al., 2013).
The discrete windows are “glued” together because the
content (“semantics” in a broader sense, including semantic
and syntactic structures) is carried over from previous time
windows. Thus, semantics is the glue for the sequence of
time windows. Beyond semantic and syntactic structures,
such glues are functional in our model, given two presup-
positions: the concept of identity “of something as
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something” and the time constants in the representation of
emotions. Identity is the defining characteristic by which a
percept, a thought, or a mental image is recognized as a
persisting entity over time (Pöppel, 2010; B. Zhou,
Pöppel, & Bao, 2014). Identity can be the sameness of an
object (or objects); for example, the computer screen
(or the paper) one is staring at in the previous time window
is still the same in the current time window. Identity also
can refer to mental images created for instance by sequen-
tial lines in a poem (see the example of the poem by Ver-
laine). Thus, the maintenance of identity of a percept or a
mental image is the necessary (but not sufficient) condition
for the creation of a meaningful permanence. The second
presupposition in our model to glue time windows together
is related to emotional or evaluative neural representations.
Emotional states normally last longer and can have a dura-
tion of many seconds, minutes, hours, or even days
(Verduyn & Lavrijsen, 2015). On that basis, the neural rep-
resentation of emotional evaluations could act as a func-
tional glue that bridges the sequence of 3-s time windows;
in that case, the process of connecting could stay at an
implicit level (Pöppel & Bao, 2011). The long-term emo-
tional tonality would provide the frame for continuity. Fail-
ure in using semantics as a temporal glue might account
for subjective discontinuities, as in schizophrenic patients,
for example. Such patients often exhibit discontinuities in
their mental activity, and it has been suggested that the dis-
turbance of the semantic connection of successive units
could be the reason for this problem (Bleuler, 1969; Martin
et al., 2014; Pöppel, 1989b).
Conclusion and summary
As has been stated, behavioral as well as neural evidence
support the concept that cognitive functions operate with
multiple time windows (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007;
Martin, 1972; Szelag & Pöppel, 2000; L. Wang et al.,
2016; L. Wang et al, 2015; for an earlier review, see
Pöppel, 1997a). We have argued further on the basis of
experimental evidence that there is indeed a 3-s time win-
dow in poetry and other linguistic behaviors, and that these
discrete windows do not disprove perceptual and concep-
tual continuity. To illustrate the latter point, we introduced
the reafference principle as a concept and argued that the
three-stage process creates the basis for continuity across
temporal windows. This reasoning brings us back to the
initial remarks; although one owns only one time window
in history, stories, poems, or theories will be passed down
through generations. The continuity across discrete win-
dows is achieved through the complementarity as a genera-
tive principle of passing and receiving. Thus, our model on
continuity of windows can also be seen as being inspired
by human anthropological universals (Bao & Pöppel, 2012)
from different poets in different windows and different cul-
tures. Not only can the principle of reafference bring about
continuity but it also can bring about a holistic gestalt in
perception, as has been discussed in discourse
comprehension.
We also provided the possible neural and cognitive bases
for the successful operation of reafference in language (and
possibly other cognitive processes). To further elucidate the
process of reafference in language, we also need to settle
the underpinnings for reafference on the neurobiological
level in future research. It is also worth researching whether
different levels of linguistic stimuli (e.g., syllable level,
word level, etc.; word category level, semantic level, syntax
level, etc.) operate on the same or different neurobiological
routes. The reafference principle is also a demonstration of
complementarity. Therefore, our reasoning also demon-
strates the power of complementarity as a generative princi-
ple (Bao, von Stosch, Park, & Pöppel, 2017). Finally, note
that poems from different cultures being characterized by
anthropological universals provide an ideal data source to
reflect on discrete time and temporal permanence.
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